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I. INTRODUCTION
AS explored in Lawrence Friedman’s introductory essay in thissymposium,1 many a Victorian novel revolved around a simplereality: children born to unmarried mothers had “no name.”
These children existed in reality, of course, but not in law. They had
neither mothers nor fathers, as far as the law was concerned, even though
they might have lived in a house being raised by the two people who gave
them life. They did not inherit property from those adults, nor benefit
from their social reputation. Quite the contrary—they represented a re-
jection of conventional social norms that resulted in the loss of respect
from polite society. As a plot point, the birth of an illegitimate child could
be and often was the basis for all sorts of intrigue—disrupted inheritance
lines, secret affairs, bigamy, sibling rivalry, and so on.
Art imitates life—and law. The reason that a revelation of a bastard
child could sustain an entire scintillating novel (scores of them, in fact) is
that the plight resonated with readers who understood that the novel
spoke the truth about the society in which they lived. But the simplicity of
the plight—that a child born to an unmarried woman had “no name”—
belies a complex set of interlocking legal and social norms that produced
and reinforced that status. The fate of these children and their mothers
was not an unfortunate side effect but rather the intended result of a
system designed to confine sex to marriage—and to punish harshly those
who transgressed the norm. The norm was maintained through several
different legal doctrines, each carrying some of the weight of keeping un-
married pregnant women in their places. In this Essay, I will explore
* Ellen K. Solender Endowed Chair in Women and the Law and Professor of Law,
SMU Dedman School of Law. My thanks to Emily Shackelford for assistance with research
and to Laura Sundin for spearheading this symposium.
1. Lawrence M. Friedman, No Name, 74 SMU L. REV. 235 (2021).
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those intersecting doctrines first in their original form (and as the back-
drop for Victorian novels) and then in their modern form, with an ac-
count of the changing social norms that led us from one place to the
other.
II. MARRIAGE, PARENTAGE, AND THE COST OF
TRANSGRESSION
The story of the Vanstone family, depicted in Wilkie Collins’s novel No
Name2 and discussed in Lawrence Friedman’s piece by the same name, is
a perfect focal point for understanding the set of family law and inheri-
tance law rules that dictated the consequences of having a “no name”
baby. In short, Andrew Vanstone and his wife (speaking of names, she
isn’t even given one in the novel) live with their two daughters, Norah
and Magdalen; the wife is pregnant with a third. He dies in an accident;
then she dies in childbirth; then, a few hours later, the baby dies too. Only
after the death of their parents and newborn sibling do the two daughters
learn a well-kept family secret: Andrew had married another “unsuita-
ble” woman abroad before he met their mother. This twist makes family
and inheritance laws central to the plot. When he returned and became
involved with another woman, he and the no-name woman assumed they
were married, but they were not. Norah and Magdalen were thus illegiti-
mate children before they were orphans. When Andrew learned that his
first wife had died, he and the mother of his children secretly married.
Their third child, who lived only briefly, was therefore legitimate. Norah
and Magdalen, however, were thrust into a lifelong drama arising from
their status at birth as “no name” children.
A variety of different legal doctrines come into play to make this story
work. Let’s begin with the adult relationships involved in this story. When
Andrew Vanstone became involved with the woman who would become
the mother of his three children, he was already married to another wo-
man. Under the laws of bigamy (then and now, in England and in the
United States), an individual can have only one spouse at a time.3 An
attempted marriage to a second person is void from the outset, regardless
of whether they go through the motions of obtaining a marriage license
and having their union solemnized by an officiant.4 The attempt to marry
a second time was also a crime, as was sex with the second partner (adul-
tery).5 Bigamy was also more common in the Victorian era; information
2. WILKIE COLLINS, NO NAME (Dover Publications 1978) (1862).
3. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY
197–201 (1993); Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Poly-
amorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 361–62 (2004).
4. See, e.g., S.C. CODE § 20-1-80 (2020) (“All marriages contracted while either of the
parties has a former wife or husband living shall be void.”).
5. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL § 255.15 (“A person is guilty of bigamy when he contracts or
purports to contract a marriage with another person at a time when he has a living spouse,
or the other person has a living spouse. Bigamy is a class E felony.”). See generally Sara
Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags to
Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 752–53 (2005); Maura Strassberg, The Crime of
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did not travel fast, and a man could just pick up and move to a new town
and start over again, with a second wife none the wiser.6 Any children
produced in that second, invalid relationship would be illegitimate. Van-
stone’s third child was saved by the death of his first wife, which freed
him up to marry the mother of his two daughters before the birth of the
third.
The plot really thickens when we turn from the rules regarding mar-
riage to those regarding parent–child relationships. Under English law,
marital status was the exclusive determinant of both legitimacy and par-
entage: a child born to married parents was legitimate, and the legal par-
ents were the woman who gave birth to the child and her husband.7 The
husband’s parentage was the product, technically, of the “marital pre-
sumption,” which assumes that a woman’s husband is the biological fa-
ther of the offspring born to her during the marriage.8 In the English
version, this rule was conclusive, absent proof that the husband was “out
of the kingdom” during the period when conception must have occurred.9
It was reinforced by Lord Mansfield’s rule, which “prevented either
spouse from giving testimony that cast doubt on the husband’s biological
paternity.”10 This meant, practically speaking, that husbands were
deemed legal fathers regardless of any biological tie to the children born
to their wives. Thus, marital status and parentage were one and the
same—a married mother bestowed legitimacy upon her children.
The plight of illegitimate children was the converse: rather than having
two legal parents regardless of biological ties to the father, a child born to
an unmarried mother had none, regardless of biological or caretaking ties
to both mother and father. An unmarried mother gave birth to a child
deemed filius nullius—the child of nobody.11 As described by Blackstone,
“I proceed next to the rights and incapacities which appertain to a bas-
tard. The rights are very few, being only such as he can acquire; for he can
inherit nothing, being looked upon as the son of nobody, and sometimes
Polygamy, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 353 (2003); Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfel-
lows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal Construction of Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 1253 (2009); Jennifer M. Collins, Ethan J. Leib & Dan Markel, Punishing Family
Status, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1327, 1345–47 (2008); Martin J. Siegel, For Better or for Worse:
Adultery, Crime & the Constitution, 30 J. FAM. L. 45 (1992).
6. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Crimes of Mobility, 43 STAN. L. REV. 637, 640–50
(1991).
7. See Theresa Glennon, Somebody’s Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital
Presumption of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 547, 562 (2000); see also MARY ANN MASON,
FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN
THE UNITED STATES (1994).
8. Jessica Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal of the Marital Presumption for the Modern
Era, 104 MINN. L. REV. 243, 248 (2019).
9. See Leslie Joan Harris, Obergefell’s Ambiguous Impact on Legal Parentage, 92
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 72 n.90 (2017).
10. Id.
11. Norma Adams, Nullius Filius: A Study of the Exception of Bastardy in the Law
Courts of Medieval England, 6 U. TORONTO L.J. 361, 377 (1946). This rule, in turn, had
Roman roots. See Horace H. Robbins & Francis Deák, The Familial Property Rights of
Illegitimate Children: A Comparative Study, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 308, 310–11 (1930).
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called filius nullius, sometimes filius populi.”12 This meant that the child
could not inherit from either biological parent, and that the parents could
not inherit from the child. It also meant that neither parent was obligated
to support the child. Mothers may have raised illegitimate children in this
era, but the legal status that might have given rise to rights or obligations
was nonexistent.
As these principles were adopted into early American law, they were
similar in structure but never quite as harsh in practice. Marital status did
often determine (or preclude) parentage, but the formal rule was some-
times ignored in favor of recognition of a tie between nonmarital chil-
dren, their mothers, and maternal kin.13 By the end of the nineteenth
century, the formal rule was replaced by one that recognized the ties be-
tween illegitimate children and unmarried mothers.14 Unwed fathers
were categorically disavowed under the law in most states, at least in
terms of whether they qualified as legal parents.15 Despite their lack of
recognition (and a concomitant lack of parental rights), unwed biological
fathers began to be subjected under state law to financial obligations.16 In
the early twentieth century, states began to pass laws formalizing the obli-
gation of parents to support their children; many of these were drafted
expressly to cover fathers’ of out-of-wedlock children.17 States estab-
lished civil and criminal causes of action for “bastardy”—the act of fa-
thering a child out of wedlock—that permitted support orders after proof
of paternity.18 Even where unwed fathers were subject to a legal obliga-
tion to support children, they generally did not have any parental rights.19
Some of the laws formally imposed the obligation of support on mothers,
but unwed mothers were practically charged with that regardless.20 How-
ever, the financial obligations imposed on unwed biological fathers did
not, as a general rule, come with parental rights.
For children born to married mothers, early American law embraced
the marital presumption, often in its conclusive form, which meant no
contrary evidence could be introduced to rebut it.21 Over the course of
the twentieth century, many states weakened the marital presumption
from conclusive to rebuttable.22 However, successful rebuttals were rare.
As Theresa Glennon has noted, “the marital presumption prevailed in all
12. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *458.
13. See MASON, supra note 7, at 24; see also MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE
HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 207–15 (1985).
14. See generally John Witte, Jr., Ishmael’s Bane: The Sin and Crime of Illegitimacy
Reconsidered, 5 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 327, 336–37 (2003).
15. See id. at 335.
16. Id. at 337.
17. 4 CHESTER G. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 231, at 5 (1936).
18. Id.
19. See generally Leslie Joan Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage and the Clash Be-
tween Custody and Child Support, 42 IND. L. REV. 611, 614–18, 626–31 (2009).
20. See id.
21. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 120 (1989) (plurality opinion) (describ-
ing and upholding conclusive marital presumption of paternity).
22. Feinberg, supra note 8, at 248–54.
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but a very limited set of circumstances through the first half of the twenti-
eth century.”23 But even as scientific developments increased the capabil-
ity of accurately determining paternity—first through blood-typing
evidence that could be used to exclude a man as a father, and then
through DNA testing that could be used to affirmatively prove pater-
nity—courts continued to be reluctant to exclude husbands as fathers or
to acknowledge biological fathers who were not husbands. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court upheld a determination of husband-paternity despite
blood-typing evidence that excluded him, significant evidence that he was
stationed far away from his wife during the likely period of conception,
and strong evidence of an extramarital affair and attempted cover-up.24
That’s how strong the marital presumption was, even when it was techni-
cally rebuttable. The marital presumption was more than a stand-in for
biology, however. It represented not only the state’s best guess as to the
father of a married woman’s child but also the state’s normative prefer-
ence. Sex with anyone else was taboo, even illegal perhaps, and the very
process of making the determination of paternity could ruin the woman’s
reputation and delegitimize her child, without any obvious offsetting ben-
efit.25 The cuckold was more likely to be a proper father than the
interloper.
The laws that cemented the lesser status of nonmarital children—and
the non-status of unwed fathers—were found in different, intersecting le-
gal doctrines. The core regulation of parent–child relationships is found
in the family law or domestic relations code of each state. There, one can
find the basic rules about who qualifies as a parent and what rights come
with that status. For example, the 1967 version of the Illinois Juvenile
Court Act—a statute that would eventually be invalidated by the U.S.
Supreme Court—defined “parent” to include both mother and father in
the case of legitimate children, but only the mother in the case of illegiti-
mate children.26 But the true plight of the “no name” child resulted from
the intersection of parentage laws with other areas of law, such as inheri-
tance law and tort law.
23. Glennon, supra note 7, at 565.
24. See Prochnow v. Prochnow, 80 N.W.2d 278, 280–81 (Wis. 1957). The Wisconsin
Supreme Court upheld the lower’s finding that the husband was the legal father, despite
admitting the implausibility of the wife’s story. As the majority wrote, “Cynics, among
whom we on this occasion we must reluctantly number ourselves, might reasonably con-
clude that Joyce, finding herself pregnant in February or early March, made a hasty excur-
sion to her husband’s bed and an equally abrupt withdrawal when her mission was
accomplished. The subsequent birth of a full-term child a month sooner than it would usu-
ally be expected if caused by this copulation does nothing to dispel uncharitable doubts.”
Id. at 280.
25. On the law’s confinement of legitimate sex to marriage, see JOANNA L. GROSSMAN
& LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CEN-
TURY AMERICA (2011). One study in the 1940s found that 10% of children born to married
women were fathered by someone other than the woman’s husband. See Chris W. Alten-
bernd, Quasi-Marital Children: The Common Law’s Failure in Privette and Daniel Calls
for Statutory Reform, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 219, 227–28 (1999).
26. ILL. REV. STAT. 1972, ch. 37, ¶ 701-14, invalidated by Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 650 (1972).
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Inheritance law dictates the passage of property upon a person’s death.
In Victorian England, the mechanisms of entail (created by a property
owner in a will or other transfer) and primogeniture (intestate rule)
meant that land often ended up in the hands of a parent’s eldest son.27
(Downton Abbey fans might recall that the opening premise of the show
arose when a cousin of Lord Grantham sunk with the Titanic, dying with-
out an obvious male heir.)28 Although primogeniture never made it into
American law, there were a variety of other rules that increased the like-
lihood that children would benefit from their parents’ wealth. Intestacy
laws provided some protection for children by providing that when a per-
son dies without a will, their estate passes to a spouse and descendants.
Despite significant differences between the English and American inheri-
tance schemes, “no name” children, historically, would fare equally
poorly in both systems.
In the American system, inheritance protections for children turn on
legal parent–child status. In other words, the family law rules dictate
whether two people are related as parent and child, and the inheritance
laws dictate the rights of those who qualify as children. Children have
three main inheritance protections. First, when a parent dies without a
will, children inherit the estate unless there is a surviving spouse, in which
case they either share the estate or get trumped, depending on the partic-
ular state’s intestacy code.29 Second, although only Louisiana has a forced
share for children, most states have provisions designed to protect chil-
dren against accidental disinheritance.30 Thus, a child who is born or
adopted after the execution of a parent’s will or accidentally omitted
from a will might be able to claim a share. This approach replaces the
common law rule under which a man’s premarital will would be invali-
dated by marriage and birth of a child, which was the traditional English
rule.31 Third, disinherited children usually have standing to file a will con-
test—and tend to be sympathetic figures to the judges or juries who de-
cide whether to set aside a parent’s will on grounds of incapacity, undue
27. For more detail on the relevant English law, see Lloyd Bonfield, Farewell
Downton Abbey, Adieu Primogeniture and Entail: Britain’s Brief Encounter with Forced
Heirship, 58 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 479 (2018).
28. See Sarah Lyall, Son and Heir? In Britain, Daughters Cry No Fair, N.Y. TIMES,
June 23, 2013, at A1 (discussing Downton Abbey plot and the gender inequity of
primogeniture).
29. See generally Danaya C. Wright, Inheritance Equity: Reforming the Inheritance
Penalties Facing Children in Nontraditional Families, 25 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 10
& n.22 (2015).
30. On the history and evolution of Louisiana’s forced heirship statute, see Katherine
Shaw Spaht, Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Cynthia Picou, Cynthia Samuel & Frederick W.
Swaim, Jr., The New Forced Heirship Legislation: A Regrettable “Revolution”, 50 LA. L.
REV. 409 (1990). On accidentally disinherited children, see Richard F. Storrow, Family
Protection in the Law of Succession: The Policy Puzzle, 11 NE. U. L. REV. 98 (2019).
31. Wills Act 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, § 18 (Eng.); see also CORPUS JURIS
SECUNDUM WILLS § 438 (2021).
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influence, or some other defect in the will.32 Historically, the “no name”
child would have benefited from none of these protections. If family law
dictated that no parent–child relationship existed, then that child could
not qualify as an heir or a forgotten child.33 And even legitimate children
might suffer an inheritance loss if they had half-siblings because relatives
of the “half-blood” were usually disqualified from inheriting or had their
shares cut in half.34
The bars on inheritance by illegitimate children were often expressly
laid out in the probate code.35 Other penalties for one’s “accident of
birth” could be found in other sections of the code.36 Wrongful death
laws, for example, granted standing only to those recognized as intestate
heirs.37 Illegitimate children could not recover for a parent’s injury under
workmen’s compensation laws.38 They could not renew a parent’s copy-
right protection,39 inherit through intestate succession,40 or qualify as de-
pendents under welfare programs.41 These legal penalties and disabilities
were by design—to deter nonmarital childbearing and punish those
stepped outside of the acceptable social bounds. “The bastard,” as one
researcher wrote in 1939,
like the prostitute, thief, and beggar, belongs to that motley crowd of
disreputable social types which society has generally resented, always
endured. He is a living symbol of social irregularity, an undeniable
evidence of contramoral forces; in short, a problem—a problem as
old and unsolved as human existence itself.42
Andrew Vanstone’s children were thus the victims of a perfect storm—
marriage law, parentage law, and inheritance law—that combined to en-
sure that his two surviving daughters were destined to live as social
outcasts.
32. See generally Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571
(1997); Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235
(1996).
33. Whether children are entitled to Social Security benefits when a parent dies also
turns on the state parentage law determination, even though the benefits are provided by
federal law. See Astrue v. Capato, 566 U.S. 541 (2012).
34. See Ralph C. Brashier, Consanguinity, Sibling Relationships, and the Default Rules
of Inheritance Law: Reshaping Half-Blood Statutes to Reflect the Evolving Family, 58 SMU
L. REV. 137, 161–63 (2005).
35. See id. at 159.
36. On the general state of affairs before the Supreme Court first recognized a right
against illegitimacy discrimination, see Note, The Rights of Illegitimates Under Federal Stat-
utes, 76 HARV. L. REV. 337 (1962).
37. See Harry D. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REV. 477,
480 (1967); Witte, supra note 14, at 335. See generally Harry D. Krause, Bringing the Bas-
tard into the Great Society—A Proposed Uniform Act on Legitimacy, 44 TEX. L. REV. 829
(1966).
38. See, e.g., Murrell v. Indus. Comm’n, 126 N.E. 189, 190–91 (Ill. 1920).
39. See Note, supra note 36, at 342.
40. Witte, supra note 14, at 335.
41. See id.
42. Kingsley Davis, Illegitimacy and Social Structure, 45 AM. J. SOC. 215, 215 (1939).
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III. THE SHIFT AWAY FROM THE PAST
At the margins, there was some softening of the harsh English rules for
“no name” children as those rules were adopted first by American colo-
nies and then by states and territories. But the key components of the
system—parentage tied to marriage, harsh penalties for illegitimacy, and
property and inheritance rights flowing only from and through formal
parent–child ties—remained in place for two centuries. The system finally
began to crumble in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, as social
norms evolved to be more tolerant of sex outside of marriage, as well as
of the children that might result. These changes were the product of a
variety of forces, including the civil rights movement, the sexual freedom
movement, and the burgeoning women’s rights movement. The develop-
ing constitutional right of privacy reflected and reinforced these changes,
as both married and single women had greater control over contraception
and abortion.43 Nonmarital cohabitation went from rare to commonplace
over the course of just a few decades.44 So did nonmarital childbearing:
Estimated at only 3.8% in 1940, nonmarital childbearing began to in-
crease sharply in the 1970s.45 By 1985, 22.0% of all children were born to
unmarried mothers; in 1997, 32.4%; and by 2008, 40.6%.46 The births to
unmarried women have declined slightly since 2008: in 2018, 39.6% of all
births were to unmarried women.47 Enormous racial and ethnic variations
persist today. In 2018, the rate of nonmarital births for non-Hispanic
white women was 28.2%, while the rate for non-Hispanic black women
was 69.4%, and the rate for Hispanic women was 51.8%.48
The changes in nonmarital cohabitation and nonmarital childbearing
began to be felt and reflected in the law. The traditional system was
under pressure, as it increasingly did not reflect the American family. The
conventional approach lost its hold as the Supreme Court recognized that
unwed fathers had a constitutional right not to be categorically excluded
from their children’s lives and that nonmarital children had the constitu-
tional right not to be singled out for disadvantage.
As nonmarital sex and childbearing became more common, the unfair-
ness of laws that penalized children for the “sins” of their parents became
43. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (invalidating ban on sale
of contraceptives to married couples under principles of substantive due process); Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (invalidating ban on sale of contraceptives to single
people under principles of equal protection); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166–67 (1973)
(invalidating ban on pre-viability abortion under principles of substantive due process).
44. See THEODORE CAPLOW, LOUIS HICKS & BEN. J. WATTENBERG, THE FIRST MEA-
SURED CENTURY: AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO TRENDS IN AMERICA, 1900–2000, at 72–73
(2001) (estimating proportion of cohabiting U.S. couples at 0.2% in 1960 to 7.1% in 1998).
45. Stephanie J. Ventura & Christine A. Bachrach, Nonmarital Childbearing in the
United States, 1940–99, NAT’L VITAL STATS. REPS., Oct. 18, 2000, at 17 tbl.1.
46. Joyce A. Martin, Brady E. Hamilton, Paul D. Sutton, Stephanie J. Ventura, T.J.
Matthews & Michelle J.K. Osterman, Births: Final Data for 2008, NAT’L VITAL STATS.
REPS., Dec. 8, 2010, at 10 tbl.C.
47. See Joyce A. Martin, Brady E. Hamilton, Michelle J.K. Osterman & Anne K. Dris-
coll, Births: Final Data for 2018, NAT’L VITAL STATS. REPS., Nov. 27, 2019, at 5.
48. Id. at 5.
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more apparent. The Supreme Court first took up this issue in 1968, in
Levy v. Louisiana.49 A state law prevented a deceased mother’s five chil-
dren from collecting damages for her wrongful death because they had
been born out of wedlock.50 The Court struck down the law as a form of
invidious discrimination, given that “[l]egitimacy or illegitimacy of birth
has no relation to the nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the
mother.”51 State law classifications on grounds of illegitimacy were enti-
tled to heightened scrutiny at the same level as those based on gender or
alienage.52 Although the Court did not invalidate every law that distin-
guished among people based on legitimacy under this standard, it did
consistently rule that states could not arbitrarily single out illegitimate
children for disadvantage.53 And perhaps more important to the overall
dismantling of the conventional system, even when courts upheld differ-
ential treatment of nonmarital children, they did not question the exis-
tence of a legal mother–child relationship.54 These cases ultimately stood
for the idea that marital status had no effect on the legal mother–child
relationship, even if states still had some leeway to impose financial pen-
alties designed to deter nonmarital births.
The second key shift away from the traditional system built on the first
and was even more consequential. In Stanley v. Illinois, the Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of an Illinois rule deeming an un-
wed father a legal stranger to his children regardless of whether he had
played any role in raising them.55 Joan and Peter Stanley never married
but raised three children together and cohabited on and off for almost
two decades.56 After her death in the late 1960s, the two children, who
were still minors, were made wards of the state and placed with a court-
appointed guardian.57 Because Peter was not married to Joan, he was not
recognized as a legal parent.58 The law defined “parents” as “the father
and mother of a legitimate child, or the survivor of them, or the natural
mother of an illegitimate child, and includes any adoptive parent.”59
49. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
50. Id. at 69–70.
51. Id. at 72.
52. See id. at 71; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (applying heightened
scrutiny to sex-based classification); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971)
(applying heightened scrutiny to classification based on alienage).
53. See, e.g., Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75–76 (1968)
(holding that a law that denies mothers of illegitimate children the right to recover for
wrongful death violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution); Weber v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175–76 (1972) (invalidating law that denied workmen’s com-
pensation recovery rights to unacknowledged illegitimate children was unconstitutional).
But see Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 539–40 (1971).
54. See, e.g., Labine, 401 U.S. at 538.
55. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646–47 (1972).
56. Id. at 646.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 646–47.
59. The provisions applicable to this case are cited and discussed in the opinion of the
Illinois Supreme Court. See In re Stanley, 256 N.E.2d 814, 815 (Ill. 1970), rev’d sub nom.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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Thus, when Joan died, the children had no legal parent and were there-
fore deemed “dependent” on the state under the child welfare law.60 Pe-
ter could have petitioned to be their custodian or guardian, but even if he
were appointed, he would not be their legal parent. He would have to
adopt his own children in order to obtain the status he thought he already
had.
The Supreme Court concluded that the law categorically excluding un-
wed fathers from the definition of “parent” violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.61 The starting point was the
Court’s prior rulings on illegitimacy discrimination:
Nor has the law refused to recognize those family relationships un-
legitimized by a marriage ceremony. The Court has declared uncon-
stitutional a state statute denying natural, but illegitimate, children a
wrongful-death action for the death of their mother, emphasizing
that such children cannot be denied the right of other children be-
cause familial bonds in such cases were often as warm, enduring, and
important as those arising within a more formally organized family
unit.62
The state does not, the majority continued, have unfettered discretion to
“draw [the] ‘legal’ lines [of parenthood] as it chooses.”63 The Court ap-
plied the well-established principle that “[t]he rights to conceive and to
raise one’s children” are “essential.”64 This principle was established in
the early twentieth century, decades before the Supreme Court recog-
nized rights related to contraception, abortion, or other aspects of pri-
vacy. In a trilogy of cases, the Court recognized that parents have a
fundamental right to make decisions about the care, custody, and control
of their children.65 Parental rights are not absolute, but they are funda-
mental and cannot be abridged by the state without a compelling
reason.66
60. ILL. REV. STAT. 1967, ch. 37, ¶ 702-05 (current version at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT.
405/2-4 (2021)).
61. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 657–58.
62. Id. at 651–52.
63. Id. at 652 (quoting Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75–76
(1968)).
64. Id. at 651 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
65. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402 (invalidating state law banning instruction in any for-
eign language before ninth grade); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925)
(invalidating an Oregon law requiring children between ages eight and sixteen to attend
public school); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (upholding conviction of
child’s aunt for allowing her niece to sell religious pamphlets on the street in violation of
state labor law).
66. The Supreme Court strongly reinforced this line of cases in a modern one. In
Troxel v. Granville, the Supreme Court fortified this robust notion of parental rights by
invalidating a third-party visitation statute that did not give enough weight to the prefer-
ences of a fit parent. 530 U.S. 57, 75 (2000) (plurality opinion). The Washington state law at
issue allowed “any person” at “any time” to petition for visitation with a child and permit-
ted courts to grant such requests based solely on the best interests of the child. See id. at 60
(quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.106(30) (1994)).
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The Stanley Court then considered whether Illinois’s choice to exclude
unwed fathers from the category of “parent” was a constitutionally per-
missible means of achieving the state’s desired ends.67 Quite the con-
trary—the Court concluded that the categorical disavowal of unwed
fathers actually undermined the state’s identified interests.68 The state
aimed “to protect ‘the moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of
the minor and the best interests of the community’ and to ‘strengthen the
minor’s family ties whenever possible.’”69 Yet it adopted a system that
would at least sometimes result in children being cut off from custodial,
biological fathers for reasons wholly unrelated to their capacity to parent.
As the Court observed, “[T]he State registers no gain toward its declared
goals when it separates children from the custody of fit parents. Indeed, if
Stanley is a fit father, the State spites its own articulated goals when it
needlessly separates him from his family.”70 Even if “most unmarried fa-
thers are unsuitable and neglectful parents[,] . . . some are wholly suited
to have custody of their children.”71 The state was not permitted to rely
on an irrebuttable presumption at the expense of individual due process
rights, even though this approach was “cheaper and easier than individu-
alized determination.”72 It had to make it possible for unwed fathers to
establish parentage, even if they were not automatically endowed with
that status.73
Stanley spelled the end of a very long era in which children born to
unmarried mothers did not have legal fathers. The Supreme Court would
continue the work it began in Stanley in a series of cases in which it con-
sidered the scope of unwed fathers’ constitutional parental rights. In
those later cases, not all of which involved a father like Stanley who had
lived with and participated in raising his children, the Court settled on a
standard that made legal fatherhood a possibility but not an inevitability.
And it declined to insist that unwed mothers and fathers be treated iden-
tically, given biological differences relevant to the reproductive process
and the relatively greater difficulty of ascertaining the connection of fa-
thers to their offspring compared with mothers. Women become legal
mothers by giving birth, unless the birth occurs within an enforceable sur-
rogacy arrangement. For men, however, the biological connection creates
an opportunity for legal fatherhood that must be affirmatively grasped—
or can be sacrificed.74 If a man fails to grasp the opportunity to act like a
67. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652–53 (1972).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 652.
70. Id. at 652–53.
71. Id. at 654.
72. Id. at 656–57.
73. See id. at 657–58.
74. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, at 249–50 (1983) (upholding New York’s putative
father registry as sufficient protection for the parental rights of unwed fathers); see also
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255–56 (1978) (upholding provision of Georgia code that
denied an unwed father the right to veto a proposed adoption because father had failed to
legitimate child through available statutory procedure); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380, 381–82 (1979) (invalidating New York law that gave unmarried mothers but not un-
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father, “the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a State to
listen to his opinion of where the child’s best interests lie.”75 Men who
hesitate lose out, but those who rise to the occasion can secure legal
rights.76
The illegitimacy and unwed-father cases combined to accelerate a shift
in the conception of the nonmarital family. As a result of developing so-
cial norms and the recognition of constitutional rights that protected
nonmarital as well as marital families, the historical tie between marriage
and parentage began to loosen. With a little forced loosening by the Su-
preme Court, states began to rethink aspects of the law and policies gov-
erning the creation of parent–child relationships. The modern scheme is
best exemplified by the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), which was first
proposed in 1973 and significantly amended in 2002 and again in 2017.77
Under the UPA, a man is the “legal father” of a child under any of the
following conditions: the adjudication or acknowledgment of paternity,
marriage to the mother, open and notorious acknowledgment of father-
hood, or clear and convincing evidence of paternity.78 The adoption of
the UPA and similar statutes finalized a shift away from reliance on mari-
tal status as a proxy for biological fatherhood and toward recognition,
and protection, of both burgeoning and full-fledged father–child
relationships.
Most states designed new statutory schemes that gave at least constitu-
tionally required protection to unwed fathers—often more—while bal-
ancing the desire to facilitate the mother’s choice to surrender a child for
adoption or raise a child with a new partner when the biological father
was unlikely to be a source of care or financial support.79 This trend was
reinforced by Congress’s intervention into child support law beginning in
the 1980s, when it began to impose mandates on states as a condition of
receiving welfare subsidies. Among the mandates was the requirement
that states allow a mother and father to sign a “voluntary acknowledg-
ment of paternity,” which is one basis for establishing legal parentage for
unwed fathers.80 Paternity can also be adjudicated by a court, in a pro-
ceeding brought by the mother and perhaps the father or a third party as
married fathers the right to veto an adoption); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
123–24 (1989) (plurality opinion) (finding that that California’s refusal to permit putative
fathers to contest the paternity of children born during their mother’s marriage to another
did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
75. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
76. See, e.g., In re Adoption of B.Y., 356 P.3d 1215, 1219–20 (Utah 2015) (denying
parental rights to teen father who relied on representations by the mother about how to
protect his rights); see also Joanna L. Grossman, He Who Hesitated Lost: Unwed Father in
Utah Forfeits Parental Rights, JUSTIA: VERDICT (Sept. 2, 2015), https://verdict.justia.com/
2015/09/02/he-who-hesitated-lost-unwed-father-in-utah-forfeits-parental-rights [https://
perma.cc/B4EV-H2ZN].
77. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
78. See id. § 204.
79. On the evolution of modern paternity law, see Leslie Joan Harris, Reforming Pa-
ternity Law to Eliminate Gender, Status, and Class Inequality, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1295,
1299–1307 (2013).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C) (2018).
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well.81 Federal law also requires that mothers who apply for public assis-
tance cooperate with child support enforcement officials to establish pa-
ternity and obtain a child support order.82
The resulting statutes give men a variety of ways to assert paternity but
impose time limits and other procedural requirements that sometimes
make it difficult for even a well-meaning father to preserve his rights.83
The bright-line rules that made “no name” children such a reliable plot
line became blurred. It might be weeks, months, or even years before we
know whether a particular child has one parent or two. Moreover, the
social and legal consequences of this determination are much less signifi-
cant than they once were. In addition to revising their parentage statutes
to establish pathways to fatherhood for unmarried men, most states
adopted a statute expressly providing that parentage does not depend on
marital status and that a child’s relationships with either or both parents
are not a function of legitimacy.84
In this long-running conflict over the treatment of unwed fathers (and
their illegitimate children), states struggled to maintain a system that was
not only workable—i.e., one that did not preclude adoption placements—
but also sufficiently protective of the constitutional parental rights unwed
fathers could have if they played their cards right.85 Here, the conflict was
between state laws that employed too narrow a definition of parentage to
comply with constitutional standards.86 The genetic tie gives rise to a con-
stitutional right to parent, which, in turn, sets the parameters for state
parentage law—men who grasped the opportunity to parent gained coe-
qual status with their children’s mothers, a status that state parentage law
cannot override by statute.87
IV. MODERNIZING MOTHERHOOD
Although the key legal changes that led to the dismantling of the tradi-
tional system of parentage revolved around the rights of unwed fathers
and nonmarital children, they cleared a path for the modernization of
motherhood as well. Once the law untethered parentage from marriage,
the additional steps necessary to recognize a wide variety of parent–child
ties became less drastic. This has had the effect of giving women more
81. See generally Jeffrey A. Parness, Old-Fashioned Pregnancy, Newly-Fashioned Pa-
ternity, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 57 (2003).
82. See Jeffrey A. Parness, New Federal Paternity Laws: Securing More Fathers at Birth
for the Children of Unwed Mothers, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 59, 63–64 (2006); Deborah Harris,
Child Support for Welfare Families: Family Policy Trapped in its Own Rhetoric, 16 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 619, 621 (1988).
83. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017). See generally
GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 288–96.
84. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.202 (West 2019).
85. See Elizabeth Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and
After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 313, 315–18 (1984).
86. See id. at 330–31.
87. Joanna L. Grossman, Parentage Without Gender, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 717, 723–24 (2016).
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control over reproduction and co-parenting relationships.88 Once a stig-
matized object of shame or pity, the unwed mother has become the norm.
This is a world in which “Single Mothers by Choice” can thrive as an
advocacy group because women can legally choose to parent children
alone—whether through birth or adoption.89 They can conceive children
with sperm from a spouse, an unmarried partner, or a known or unknown
donor.90 They can also legally choose to parent children with an unmar-
ried male partner or with a married or unmarried female partner. These
options are all made possible by the evolution of parentage law to em-
brace parent–child ties that arise outside of marriage or in other ways
that would have been incomprehensible to the common law.
Parentage law both reflects and reinforces changing social norms. Sin-
gle parents represent an increasing proportion of all households; single
mothers greatly outnumber single fathers.91 In 1970, single mothers ac-
counted for only 11% of families with minor children, but they accounted
for 29% in 2020.92 But while the law has evolved to provide greater legal
and economic security for single-mother families, societal attitudes have
not caught up. Societal attitudes about single mothers have traditionally
been negative, reflecting stereotypes about them as depending on wel-
fare, holding non-traditional values, or engaging in sexually promiscuous
behavior.93 And even when researchers control for context, single fathers
are viewed more positively than single mothers.94 The stigma has been
stubbornly resistant to change.95 And the realities of single motherhood
are far from utopian; many single mothers struggle with poverty and find
88. See id. at 726.
89. See Jackie Molloy, Portraits of Single Moms by Choice, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/05/parenting/single-moms-by-choice-photos.html [https://
perma.cc/U5PC-PP48]; see also SINGLE MOTHERS BY CHOICE, http://
www.singlemothersbychoice.org [https://perma.cc/Y5A6-W8P7].
90. See Joanna L. Grossman, Men Who Give It Away: The Potential Perils of Free and
Non-Anonymous Sperm Donation, JUSTIA: VERDICT (Jan. 24, 2012), https://ver-
dict.justia.com/2012/01/24/men-who-give-it-away [https://perma.cc/2CFE-PCQ4].




93. For a review of the literature about these attitudes, see Sarah L. DeJean, Christi
McGeorge & Thomas Stone Carlson, Attitudes Toward Never-Married Single Mothers and
Fathers: Does Gender Matter?, 24 J. FEMINIST FAMILY THERAPY 121 (2012); Julie A.
Mavity Maddalena, Floodwaters and the Ticking Clock: The Systematic Oppression and
Stigmatization of Poor, Single Mothers in America and Christian Theological Responses, 63
CROSSCURRENTS 148 (2013) (discussing the stereotypes about single mothers woven into
modern welfare policy); Parvin R. Huda, Singled Out: A Critique of the Representation of
Single Motherhood in Welfare Discourse, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 341 (2001) (ap-
plying intersectionality theory to understand the stereotypes about low-income single
mothers).
94. Id. at 132–33.
95. See For Single Mothers, Stigma Difficult to Shake, NPR (Feb. 24, 2011), https://
www.npr.org/2011/02/24/134031175/For-Single-Mothers-Stigma-Difficult-To-Shake [https://
perma.cc/FY4E-VDGP]; Nicola Carroll, One in Four Children Grow Up in a Single-Parent
Family—So Why Is There Still a Stigma?, CONVERSATION (Dec. 4, 2019), https://theconver-
sation.com/one-in-four-children-grow-up-in-a-single-parent-family-so-why-is-there-still-a-
stigma-126562 [https://perma.cc/QH7B-L8LL].
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it difficult to work and raise children without adequate social supports,
especially for women of color.96 Yet, there are more mothers choosing to
have children on their own, a decision that many find empowering de-
spite the social stigma.97 The evolution of parentage law has given women
more options for taking on or carrying out the duties of motherhood.
Modern motherhood is also made possible, at least in part, by advances
in reproductive technology. The law permitted parenthood to be sepa-
rated from marriage, but technology has permitted it to be separated
from sex as well. Although there are hints of artificial insemination of
women with their husband’s sperm as early as the late eighteenth cen-
tury,98 it did not occur with donor sperm until at least a century later and
did not become a routine practice until at least the 1950s.99 And in that
era, sperm donation was “gradually understood by medical experts and
lawmakers as a cure for male infertility, and consequently legalized.”100
Initially, artificial insemination did not raise terribly complicated parent-
age questions because it was used almost exclusively by married wo-
men—in part because intentional single motherhood was socially
condemned and in part because doctors would not perform an insemina-
96. See generally Sarah McLanahan & Irwin Garfinkel, Single Mothers, the Underclass,
and Social Policy, 501 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 92 (1989) (exploring whether single mothers
are “part of an emerging urban underclass”); John Ifcher & Homa Zarghamee, The Happi-
ness of Single Mothers: Evidence from the General Social Survey, 15 J. HAPPINESS STUD.
1219 (2014) (finding that single motherhood is a source of unhappiness relatively to other
lifestyles); Chris M. Herbst, Footloose and Fancy Free? Two Decades of Single Mothers’
Subjective Well-Being, SOC. SERV. REV. 189 (June 2012) (same); Seohee Son & Jean W.
Bauer, Employed Rural, Low-Income, Single Mothers’ Family and Work Over Time, 31 J.
FAM. ECON. ISSUES 107 (2009) (exploring how low-income single mothers navigate work-
family balance); Polly A. Fassinger, Becoming the Breadwinner: Single Mothers’ Reactions
to Changes in Their Paid Work Lives, 38 FAM. RELS. 404 (1989) (studying experience of
divorced mothers who transition to a breadwinning role); Julianna Y. Richard & Hang-
Shim Lee, A Qualitative Study of Racial Minority Single Mothers’ Work Experiences, 66 J.
COUNSELING PSYCH. 143 (2018) (exploring the work-related challenges for single mothers
of color).
97. See Adital Ben-Ari & Galia Weinberg-Kurnik, The Dialectics Between the Personal
and the Interpersonal in the Experiences of Adoptive Single Mothers by Choice, 56 SEX
ROLES 823 (2007) (studying the experiences and decision-making by adoptive single
mothers); Jane D. Bock, Doing the Right Thing? Single Mothers by Choice and the Struggle
for Legitimacy, 14 GENDER & SOC’Y 62 (2000) (studying the decision by women to pursue
single parenthood intentionally); Marcia A. Ellison, Authoritative Knowledge and Single
Women’s Unintentional Pregnancies, 17 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 322 (2003) (exploring
the complexity of societal attitudes about single motherhood and the effect on decision-
making by women confronting an unintentional pregnancy); Valerie S. Mannis, Single
Mothers by Choice, 48 FAM. RELS. 121 (1999) (exploring the experiences of financially
independent women who deliberately undertook parenthood alone).
98. See George P. Smith II, Through a Test Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and
the Law, 67 MICH. L. REV. 127, 128–29 (1968).
99. ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 97 (1995); see also Michelle L. Anderson,
Comment, Are You My Mommy? A Call for Regulation of Embryo Donation, 35 CAP. U.
L. REV. 589, 598 (2006).
100. Noa Ben-Asher, The Curing Law: On the Evolution of Baby-Making Markets, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 1885, 1888 (2009).
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tion on an unmarried woman.101 And many of those who did rely on as-
sisted conception used the sperm of their own husband. This practice,
known as artificial insemination by husband, or AIH, was not particularly
controversial.102 The emerging practice of using sperm from a donor,
however, was perceived differently, at least initially.103 Insemination with
sperm of a third party was deemed adultery in a few cases and grounds
for divorce.104 But that view gradually gave way to sympathy for couples
with male factor infertility; donor sperm, in the words of Professor Noa
Ben-Asher, was simply a “cure” for a medical condition.105 Gradual so-
cial and legal acceptance of sperm donation, along with other forms of
assisted reproduction as they were developed, paved the way for greater
use. And advances in techniques like cryopreservation made the use of
donor sperm even more appealing—in 2015 a baby was conceived with
23-year-old sperm.106
An even bigger advance was the development of in vitro fertilization
techniques. The world’s first “test-tube” baby was born in England in
1978.107 Since then, more than eight million babies have been born using
this technique.108 This technology vastly expands the circumstances in
which a child can be conceived: it opens the door to egg donors and gesta-
tional surrogates. It also creates the possibility of a child having two
mothers, one with a genetic tie and the other a gestational tie to a child.
A rise in infertility rates also fueled a greater turn to sperm donation, in
vitro fertilization, and—toward the end of the twentieth century—egg do-
nation.109 As many as seven million people today suffer from fertility
problems, and as many as 1% of all births rely on assisted reproductive
technology of some kind.110 But it is difficult to pinpoint the number of
101. See Georgia Dullea, Artificial Insemination of Single Women Poses Difficult Ques-
tions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1979, at A18.
102. See Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close
Look at Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035, 1072–74 (2002).
103. See id. at 1076–77.
104. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (holding that
child conceived with donor sperm was not the legitimate child of mother’s husband be-
cause the insemination constituted adultery).
105. Ben-Asher, supra note 100, at 1888–89.




107. See Walter Sullivan, Woman Gives Birth to Baby Conceived Outside the Body,
N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1978, at A1.
108. Susan Scutti, At Least 8 Million IVF Babies Born in 40 Years Since Historic First,
CNN (July 3, 2018, 6:04 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/03/health/worldwide-ivf-ba-
bies-born-study/index.html [https://perma.cc/2MTZ-MDVF].
109. See Anjani Chandra, Casey E. Copen & Elizabeth Hervey Stephen, Infertility and
Impaired Fecundity in the United States, 1982–2010: Data from the National Survey of Fam-
ily Growth, NAT’L HEALTH STATS. REPS., Aug. 14, 2013, at 5 (noting an increase in “im-
paired fecundity” among all U.S. women aged 15–44 from 8.4% in 1982 to 10% in 1995 and
a high of 12% in 2002, with higher rates at each point for married women).
110. See id. at 2 (estimating that in 2002 7.3 million U.S. women had “impaired fecun-
dity or difficulties conceiving or bringing a pregnancy to term”); see also Anjani Chandra,
Casey E. Copan & Elizabeth Hervey Stephen, Infertility Service Use in the United States:
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sperm donations made per year or the number of live births conceived
with donor sperm because there is little to no regulation of the process or
industry.111 Some estimates suggest thirty to sixty thousand sperm donor-
conceived births per year in the United States,112 but the number is likely
higher.113 There is a small but growing number of conceptions from do-
nor eggs as well.114
One need only quickly peruse the options for sperm donation in this
country to appreciate how vastly different motherhood can be in modern
society compared with the past. For example, on the Known Donor Reg-
istry, a woman seeking sperm creates a profile in which she shares her
personal traits and indicates the type of arrangement she desires.115
There are pull-down menus so she can choose what gametes she wants
(sperm, eggs, or embryos), what method she prefers (artificial insemina-
tion, natural insemination, shipped on dry ice, or cryobank deposit), and
the degree of contact with the donor (contact after 18, limited contact,
frequent contact, or “uncle or friend role”).116 Potential donors create a
similar profile, which indicates what gametes they are offering, which
method they prefer for sharing them, and how much contact, if any, they
would seek with any resulting child.117 Other sites, such as Co-
ParentMatch.com, provide similar services, including “home insemination
kits” and donors from diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds.118
The modernization of motherhood is not simply a function of techno-
logical advances or new ways to connect with strangers: the law must
make it possible for women to use this technology in ways that will result
in stable, predictable family ties. Whether a woman seeks sperm from a
Data from the National Survey of Family Growth, 1982–2010, NAT’L HEALTH STATS. REPS,
Jan. 22, 2014, at 4 (estimating that in 2006–2010 12% of U.S. women aged 15–44 had used
medical intervention either to get pregnant or to prevent miscarriage).
111. See Jennifer M. Vagle, Putting the “Product” in Reproduction: The Viability of a
Products Liability Action for Genetically Defective Sperm, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 1175, 1234
(2011).
112. Stephanie Chen, With the Web, Curiosity and Luck, Sperm Donor Siblings Con-
nect, CNN, (Aug. 11, 2010, 9:25 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/LIVING/08/11/
sperm.donor.sibling.connect/index.html [https://perma.cc/GS9S-ZXVH].
113. See LIZA MUNDY, EVERYTHING CONCEIVABLE: HOW ASSISTED REPRODUCTION IS
CHANGING OUR WORLD 94 (2008) (estimating 80,000–100,000 artificial inseminations per
year).
114. See NAT’L CTR. FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2014 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOL-
OGY: NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT 45 (2016) (reporting that 20,481 cycles in U.S. in 2014
were performed using donor eggs or embryos); see also Jacqueline Mroz, One Sperm, 150
Offspring, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2011, at D1; Ron Claiborne, Babies Born from Donor
Sperm Still Big Business, ABC NEWS (Nov. 6, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/health/
2013/11/06/babies-born-from-donor-sperm-still-big-business [https://perma.cc/WZX4-
8Q5T].
115. See Frequent Questions, KNOWN DONOR REGISTRY, https://knowndonorregis-
try.com/about/faq [https://perma.cc/D42D-4VD2].
116. See KNOWN DONOR REGISTRY, http://www.knowndonorregistry.com [https://
perma.cc/7GLT-SZ3E].
117. See id.
118. See CO-PARENT MATCH, http://www.co-parentmatch.com [https://perma.cc/H6D3-
6G2J].
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free donor on the Internet or through a more “conventional” cryobank,
the law is increasingly likely to respect her choice, whether she is a single
(legal) mother or has a (legal) co-parent.
During the early days of sperm donation—which typically involved
anonymous donors, physician-assisted insemination, and only married
women—virtually every state applied a marital presumption of paternity,
discussed above. Even if rebuttable, it was hard to rebut, which meant
that the use of someone else’s sperm might be ignored in favor of a find-
ing of husband-paternity.119 This remained the case even as scientific ad-
vances made it easier first to disprove and eventually to prove paternity.
But cases involving so-called AID—artificial insemination by donor—did
sometimes throw paternity into question.120 Some courts treated the in-
semination with another man’s sperm as adultery and any resulting child
as illegitimate.121 Others, however, concluded, even in the absence of a
controlling statute, that a husband who had consented to his wife’s insem-
ination with donor sperm was the legal father. In People v. Sorenson, for
example, the California Supreme Court upheld a man’s conviction for
failure to support a child, despite proof that he was sterile and that his
wife had been inseminated with donor sperm.122 Because he consented to
the procedure, he was the “lawful father” for purposes of the family sup-
port provision in the penal code.123 A trial court in New York reached a
similar conclusion in a very early case involving visitation rights for the
husband of a woman who conceived a child with donor sperm during
their marriage.124 The court held the husband was entitled to at least the
same rights as a foster parent who had adopted a child, including visita-
tion.125 These cases were few and far between. But as artificial insemina-
tion became more common, and the conclusive marital presumption
eroded, legislatures and courts had to confront new questions about
parentage.
The modern era of parentage was catalyzed by the Supreme Court’s
rulings in the unwed father and illegitimacy cases, but it really began to
take shape upon promulgation of the UPA in 1973.126 The original UPA
was a comprehensive act designed to address issues regarding the estab-
lishment of parent–child relationships, especially those involving unwed
119. See Walter Wadlington, Artificial Insemination: The Dangers of a Poorly Kept Se-
cret, 64 NW. U. L. REV. 777, 779 n.8 (1970).
120. See generally id. at 788–92.
121. See, e.g., Doornbos v. Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308, 2308 (Super. Ct. Cook Cnty.
Ill. 1954), appeal dismissed on procedural grounds, 139 N.E.2d 844 (Ill. App. Ct. 1957);
Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963).
122. People v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495, 501–02. (Cal. 1968).
123. Id. at 498.
124. Strnad v. Strnad, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390, 391–92 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
125. Id.; see also In re Adoption of Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430, 435–36 (Sur. Ct.
1973) (allowing ex-husband of child conceived during marriage with donor sperm to object
to child’s adoption by woman’s new husband, given state’s strong policy in favor of
legitimacy).
126. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1973).
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fathers.127 As the drafters noted in the prefatory statement, the act was
“promulgated at a time when the states need new legislation on this sub-
ject because the bulk of current law on the subject of children born out of
wedlock is either unconstitutional or subject to grave constitutional
doubt.”128 It was against this backdrop that NCCUSL drafted the original
UPA.
States were receptive to the uniform act because many had parentage
laws that did not conform to the newly articulated constitutional stan-
dards on illegitimacy or the rights of unwed fathers. The 1973 UPA pro-
posed a coherent set of rules that fixed those constitutional infirmities
and accounted for a wider range of parentage questions. The UPA moved
beyond the traditional approach that conflated questions of legitimacy
and parentage, which opened the door to more rational considerations of
the policies that might support or undermine a determination of parent-
age in a particular situation. While the UPA replicated the typical rule for
motherhood—that a woman was entitled to legal parent status solely
based on the act of giving birth—it changed the formula for fatherhood
quite dramatically. A man could be treated as a father based on his mar-
riage to the mother, as he could have under the traditional marital pre-
sumption. But that was just one of several ways to determine whether a
man was a child’s legal father. Legal fatherhood was based on a “network
of presumptions which cover cases in which proof of external circum-
stances (in the simplest case, marriage between the mother and a man)
indicate a particular man to be the probable father.” Section 4 of the
UPA provided three pathways to fatherhood: marriage to the child’s
mother, an acknowledgment of paternity that was not disputed by the
mother, or receiving the child into his home and openly holding out the
child “as his natural child.”129
In its recognition of the increasing complexity of parentage, the UPA
also included a separate provision for children conceived through artifi-
cial insemination But the narrow focus of that section reflected the social
realities of the time—only married women were thought to be using arti-
ficial insemination when necessitated by the husband’s infertility. Section
5(b) provided that “[t]he donor of semen provided to a licensed physician
for use in artificial insemination of a married woman other than the do-
nor’s wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child
thereby conceived.” This was paired with . . . section 5(a), [which] pro-
vided that the husband of a married woman was considered the natural
father of any child she conceived with donor sperm as long as he con-
sented in writing to the insemination. In other words, a married woman
could replace the biological father with her husband if all the criteria
were met. Through this provision, intent to parent became an adequate
127. See generally id.
128. Id. at prefatory note.
129. Grossman, supra note 87, at 724–25 (footnotes omitted) (quoting UNIF. PARENT-
AGE ACT prefatory note, § 4 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1973)).
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substitute for a genetic tie.130
By their own terms, these provisions did not apply when sperm was
donated to an unmarried woman (or when the semen was not provided to
a licensed physician).131 Conceivably, a man who donated sperm to an
unmarried woman or directly to any woman could be subjected to the
obligations of fatherhood, and an unmarried woman who used donor
sperm to conceive would have no guarantee that her parental rights were
exclusive. If the woman was married, her husband might still be deemed
the legal father, depending on the strength of the marital presumption in
a particular state. If the woman was unmarried, the sperm donor could
find himself on the receiving end of an adjudication of paternity and or-
der of child support based on the genetic tie alone. And if the sperm
donor wanted to pursue parental rights, he would face no per se bar but
would instead be subjected to the statutory rules governing unwed fa-
thers, including, for any men who did not qualify as a presumed father, a
three-year statute of limitations.132 These consequences were unlikely,
however, for inseminations involving an anonymous donor, for obvious
reasons.
Eighteen states adopted the 1973 UPA fully or substantially.133 A
handful of other states adopted parentage statutes that were similar in at
least some respects. But almost as quickly as this round of parentage laws
was adopted, they became outdated. The prevalence and nature of as-
sisted reproduction changed rapidly, leading to greater use of donated
sperm by single women and lesbian couples, and by unmarried heterosex-
ual partners with male factor infertility. These changes raised more com-
plicated questions about motherhood and fatherhood.
In 1988, NCCUSL (now also known as the Uniform Law Commission)
adopted a separate act to deal with the increasingly complicated ques-
tions arising from the use of reproductive technology, the Uniform Status
of Children of Assisted Conception Act.134 Although this law was better
suited to some of the emerging practices, it was eventually withdrawn in
favor of a new version of the UPA in 2000.135 Section 702 of the new act
provided that “[a] donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of
assisted reproduction.”136 In the comment that followed, the drafters
explained:
130. Id. at 744 (footnotes omitted) (quoting UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b), (a)).
131. Id. § 5(a)–(b).
132. Id. §§ 6(c), 7.
133. A small number of states adopted the 1973 UPA but omitted the word “married”
in the sperm donor provision, generally without explanation. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 19-4-106(2) (2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.95(B) (LexisNexis 2020); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 14-2-902 (2020).
134. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILD. OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1988).
On the question of the parental status of sperm donors, for example, the act protected
donors by broadly providing for nonparenthood regardless of the mother’s marital status
or whether the semen was provided to a physician. See id. § 4(a).
135. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000).
136. Id. § 702.
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If a child is conceived as the result of assisted reproduction, this
§ clarifies that a donor (whether of sperm or egg) is not a parent of
the resulting child. The donor can neither sue to establish parental
rights, nor be sued and required to support the resulting child. In
sum, donors are eliminated from the parental equation.137
This, the drafters wrote, means that “donors are to be shielded from
parenthood in all situations in which either a married woman or a single
woman conceives a child through assisted reproduction. . . . This provides
certainty of nonparentage for prospective donors.”138
Although the drafters noted that donations to unmarried women had
“grown significantly since 1988,” they elected to continue applying the
nonpaternity rule to donors who provided sperm to unmarried women,
the children of whom would have “no legally recognized father.”139 Sec-
tions 703 and 704 provided, as did the original UPA, that a husband who
consents to use of donor sperm by his wife is the father of any resulting
child.140
The 2000 UPA was amended in 2002.141 With respect to sperm donated
to unmarried women, this version added, for the first time, the possibility
that an unmarried male partner could be deemed the legal father of a
child conceived by his female partner with donor sperm.142 Section 703,
which previously spoke only of husbands, now provided that “[a] man
who provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted reproduction by a wo-
man as provided in Section 704 with the intent to be the parent of her
child, is a parent of the resulting child.”143 And Section 704 provided:
(a) Consent by a woman, and a man who intends to be a parent of a
child born to the woman by assisted reproduction must be in a re-
cord signed by the woman and the man. This requirement does not
apply to a donor.
(b) Failure [of] a man to sign a consent required by subsection (a),
before or after birth of the child, does not preclude a finding of pa-
ternity if the woman and the man, during the first two years of the
child’s life resided together in the same household with the child and
openly held out the child as their own.144
The comment that followed explained that “[t]he ‘holding out’ require-
ment substitutes evidence of the parties’ conduct after the child is born
for the requirement of formal consent in a record to prospective assisted
reproduction.”145 But note that the “holding out” required that the man
and woman live in the same household and hold themselves out as par-
ents together. The post-birth conduct was thus evidence not only of the
137. Id. § 702 cmt.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. §§ 703, 704.
141. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2002).
142. See id. § 703.
143. Id.
144. Id. § 704.
145. Id. § 704 cmt.
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man’s intent to parent but also of the woman’s consent to share parental
rights. And a comment to Section 706, which explained how and when
consent by a husband or unmarried partner could be withdrawn (only
prior to conception), noted that:
[A] child born through assisted reproduction accomplished after con-
sent has been voided by divorce or withdrawn in a record will have a
legal mother . . . . However, the child will have a genetic father, but
not a legal father . . . . The section is intended to encourage careful
drafting of assisted reproduction agreements. The attorney and the
parties themselves should discuss the issue and clarify their intent
before a problem arises.146
In this iteration, the UPA shifted the line between donors and potential
fathers again, but not in a linear direction. It began to focus on pre-con-
ception intent as the touchstone for distinguishing between the two
groups rather than focusing on biology, the formality of the medical pro-
cess, or marital status. The UPA was amended again in 2017.147 The
sperm donor provisions largely track the 2002 version but add two new
means through which a “donor” can establish parentage: a written pre-
conception agreement with the woman that they both intend to parent
the child, or sufficient evidence to establish that an express agreement
was reached even if not memorialized by a writing.148
Across the nation, states still vary significantly in their treatment of
parentage in the context of sperm donation. Three-quarters of the states
have a statute that applies a rule of nonpaternity in at least some situa-
tions.149 Some are still based on the original 1973 UPA, some have been
amended to reflect the 2000, 2002, or 2017 changes, and some are sui
generis. Several statutes, for example, provide that a man who donates
sperm to an unmarried woman is not a father unless he and the woman
agreed otherwise in writing before the birth.150 None of these statutes
apply to conceptions achieved through sexual intercourse.151
Whether a particular man will be treated as a donor or as a potential
father is still a function of both factual and legal variables. Thus, whether
a woman’s choice to parent alone, with an unmarried partner, or with a
146. Id. § 706 cmt.
147. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
148. See id. § 704.
149. Joanna L. Grossman, Friends with Benefits: Texas Man Who Donated Sperm to a
Friend Has Parental Rights, JUSTIA: VERDICT (Nov. 29, 2016), https://verdict.justia.com/
2016/11/29/friends-benefits-texas-man-donated-sperm-friend-parental-rights [https://
perma.cc/QC4E-3R6Z].
150. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2208(f) (West 2020)) (“The donor of semen pro-
vided to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the
donor’s wife is treated in law as if he were not the birth father of a child thereby conceived,
unless agreed to in writing by the donor and the woman.”); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b)(1)
(Deering 2020) (same).
151. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 701 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017); see also Straub v.
B.M.T., 645 N.E.2d 597, 601 (Ind. 1994) (refusing to enforce agreement to treat genetic
father as nonparent for child because “there is no such thing as ‘artificial insemination by
intercourse’”).
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spouse will ultimately be respected varies by jurisdiction and circum-
stance. But the gap between individual expectations and a legal determi-
nation of parentage is much more likely to turn on a technicality, or the
parties’ failure to work within the available legal options, than on the
law’s rebuke of the choices themselves. And parentage, in turn, is the
gateway to all other legal rights and obligations—child support, inheri-
tance, Social Security benefits, wrongful death standing, and so on. Wo-
men, by and large, have the right to choose to be single mothers, as long
as they navigate the legal landscape carefully.
An examination of other parenting situations would tell a similar story.
As Douglas NeJaime explores in his symposium piece,152 the rules gov-
erning nonbiological co-parents have largely evolved to reflect intent and
choice over biology in the establishment of parent–child ties. The law of
surrogacy, while still in flux, has trended toward a consensus that gesta-
tional surrogacy agreements can be enforced, which means that parentage
can result solely from intent.153 Likewise, in the wake of Obergefell v.
Hodges and the legalization of marriage by same-sex couples,154 the mari-
tal presumption has become a gender-neutral way of vesting parentage in
a mother’s partner.155
V. CONCLUSION
The world described in Parts III and IV of this Essay would have been
unimaginable to Blackstone—and certainly unfamiliar to the Victorian
novelists explored in Lawrence Friedman’s essay. Simply put, the “no
name” child simply doesn’t exist any longer because the society that
stripped a child of its place based on the circumstances of birth has disap-
peared. This is not a smooth, linear story line. But in fits and starts, with
missteps and corrections, and against the backdrop of seismic changes in
social norms, the child of unmarried parents has recovered its name. And
the adults have choices about whether, how, and with whom to become
parents. By modernizing fatherhood and childhood, we have modernized
motherhood as well.
152. Douglas NeJaime, Biology and Illegitimacy, 74 SMU L. REV. 259 (2021).
153. See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman, A New Age: New York Repeals Longstanding Crim-
inal Ban on Surrogacy, JUSTIA: VERDICT (Feb. 22, 2021), https://verdict.justia.com/2021/02/
22/a-new-age-new-york-repeals-longstanding-criminal-ban-on-surrogacy [https://perma.cc/
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154. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015).
155. On the development of the law of lesbian co-parents, see Joanna L. Grossman, The
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